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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 20010445-CA
v.

Priority No. 2

KENNETH BEACH,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
Defendant appeals his conviction resulting from his conditional guilty plea to
attempted unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a class A misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)(1998), in the Third Judicial District Court,
State of Utah, the Honorable David S. Young presiding. This Court has jurisdiction
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 & Supp. 2001).
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue: Was the trial court correct in denying defendant's motion to suppress
evidence obtained after defendant voluntarily engaged in a conversation with a police
officer who had witnessed defendant making a "hand-to-hand" exchange with another
individual near a known "drug house?"
Standard of Review: "'[W]e review the factual findings underlying the trial

court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress evidence using a clearly erroneous
standard. . . . [Wjhether a specific set of facts gives rise to reasonable suspicion is a
determination of law and is reviewable nondeferentially for correctness . . . [with] a
measure of discretion to the trial judge when applying that standard to a given set of
facts." City of St. George v. Carter, 945 P.2d 165, 168 (Utah App. 1997) (citing State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 & n.4 (Utah 1994)) (citation and internal quotation omitted).
This same bifurcated standard of review applies when reviewing a trial court's
determinations of when a seizure occurs, of reasonable suspicion, or of voluntary consent.
State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 987 (Utah App. 1994).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES
Pertinent portions of constitutional provisions, statutes and rules relevant to this
appeal are set forth below:
U.S. Const., amend. IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2001). Prohibited acts
- Penalties.
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or
use a controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a
2

valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while
acting in the course of his professional practice, or as
otherwise authorized by this chapter;
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On September 8, 2001, defendant was arrested and booked into jail for possession
of methamphetamine (R. 7-8, 12). Defendant was charged by information with unlawful
possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2001) (R. 7-8).
Defendant moved to suppress drugs found by the arresting officer because the
officer did not have reasonable suspicion to question him (R. 65:31-33). The trial court
denied the motion (R. 65:61).
Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted possession of a controlled substance, a class
A misdemeanor, on condition that he be allowed to appeal the denial of his suppression
motion. Defendant timely appealed (R. 46).
STATEMENT OF FACTS1
"I'm not going to lie to you guys, I have a little. "
Before the events that culminated in his arrest-before he agreed to speak with
police, consented to be searched, admitted to carrying drugs and, finally, produced a
baggy of methamphetamine—defendant was, by his account, just trying to sell his car.

1

Facts are stated in a light most favorable to the trial court's ruling denying the
motion to suppress. Salt Lake City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, H 2, 994 P.2d 1283.
3

Narcotics officers Aaron Leavitt and Josh Sharman and Sgt. Rusty Issacson were
patrolling a neighborhood near a known "drug house" when they saw defendant leaning
into the passenger side of a parked car (R. 65:7, 17). The car had no license plates or
registration (R. 65:25). Because the street was narrow and the car was double-parked and
essentially blocking one lane of traffic, Officer Leavitt decided to take a closer look (R.
65:7).
Officer Leavitt, who was driving, slowly squeezed past the parked vehicle and
passed within a few feet of defendant, who stood on the other side of the car (id.). As he
passed by the car, Officer Leavitt saw defendant and the passenger make a "hand-to-hand
exchange," although he could not see what was exchanged (R. 65:11). Because the car
was illegally parked, and because the hand-to-hand exchange is an activity Officer Leavitt
recognized from his experience in narcotics interdiction as the kind of activity that often
indicates a drug transaction, he and the other officers decided to stop and investigate
further (R. 65:7, ll). 2
Officer Leavitt attempted to turn the police vehicle around, but the street was too
narrow for a U-turn, so he backed up behind the parked vehicle facing the opposite
direction (R. 65:12). As soon as Officer Leavitt stopped and began to turn the vehicle
around-and before the squad car's emergency lights were activated—defendant began to

2

Officer Leavitt testified that he had worked in the narcotics squad for a year and
had been involved in "dozens" of drug-related arrests (R. 65:6).
4

walk away at a bnsk pace (R. 65: 12). After Officer Leavitt had parked and activated the
emergency lights. Officer Sharman and Sgt. Issacson approached the illegally parked car
(R. 65:19). Officer Leavitt, meanwhile, exited the vehicle, identified himself as a police
officer and asked defendant to speak with him (R. 65:13).
The conversation
Officer Leavitt asked defendant if he had any identification and defendant
produced a Utah ID card (R. 65:13, 25). The officer then asked defendant what he was
doing in the area. Defendant stated that he buys vehicles from salvage yards, repairs them
and then sells them (R. 65:14, 25). He said he was discussing a possible sale with the two
individuals in the car and that the hand-to-hand exchange was simply the paperwork for
that transaction (R. 65:13-14).3 Defendant acknowledged that he had just driven the car
to that location, even though his driver's licence was suspended and the car had no
licence plates or registration (R. 65:26).
Throughout the conversation, defendant was extremely nervous. He was shaking,
fidgeting and rocking from side-to-side as he spoke (R. 65:14). Because of defendant's
nervousness and the suspiciousness of the hand-to-hand exchange, Officer Leavitt
suspected the transaction between defendant and the occupants of the car was actually a
drug deal (id.).

3

After defendant was arrested, Officer Leavitt learned from Officer Sharman and
Sgt. Issacson that the two men in the car stated they were test-driving the car to decide
whether to purchase it from defendant (R. 65:20).
5

Defendant consents to a search
Officer Leavitt asked defendant if he was carrying any weapons or drugs.
Defendant said he was not (R. 65:21). Officer Leavitt then asked if defendant would
consent to a search. Defendant did not reply, but began emptying his pockets, producing
a folded flyer, pocket change and a sales slip from an auto yard, which showed defendant
had paid $500, but did not indicate what he had purchased (R. 65:23-24).
Because defendant had not answered his question, Officer Leavitt again asked
defendant if he would consent to a search (R. 65:24-25). Once again, defendant did not
respond to the question, but instead asked if he had done anything wrong (R. 65:27).
Officer Leavitt reminded defendant that he had already admitted to several
infractions-driving on a suspended license and driving an unregistered, unlicensed
vehicle {id.). Officer Leavitt also commented that defendant seemed extremely nervous
(R.65:27). In response, defendant pulled out an adult magazine and told Officer Leavitt
that he was nervous because he was carrying the magazine (id.). Officer Leavitt reviewed
the magazine and returned it to defendant.
Because defendant had not answered, Officer Leavitt once again asked defendant
if he would consent to a search (R. 65:27-28).
"Go ahead," defendant replied (R. 65:28).
"You don't have to let us/' Officer Leavitt cautioned. "[I]f you don't want to[,]
we won't" (id.).

6

"Go ahead," defendant repeated, adding: fcTm not going to lie to you guys[.] [I]
have a little" (R. 65:30).
Officer Leavitt asked defendant what he meant. In response, defendant reached
into his change pocket and retrieved a baggy containing methamphetamine (R. 65:31).
Officer Leavitt then searched defendant and discovered a second baggy of
methamphetamine (R. 65:15).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The initial contact between defendant and Officer Leavitt was a voluntary, level
one conversation that required no Fourth Amendment justification. Nonetheless, even
assuming the initial stop was a seizure, the totality of the circumstances-a known drug
area; an unlicensed, unregistered vehicle illegally blocking traffic; a telltale hand-to-hand
exchange—created reasonable suspicion that illegal activity had taken place. In
attempting to learn whether his suspicions were valid, Officer Leavitt properly asked
defendant who he was and what he was doing in the area. Because defendant's claim that
he was simply selling his car could not be immediately confirmed, Officer Leavitt was
justified in continuing to question defendant and ultimately asking him if he would
consent to a search. Defendant's consent was obtained voluntarily and without coercion.
Accordingly, the motion to suppress the drugs obtained from defendant was properly
denied by the trial court.

7

ARGUMENT
I.

DEFENDANT'S ENCOUNTER WITH POLICE WAS CONSENSUAL.

Defendant claims he was seized for Fourth Amendment purposes from the moment
the officer stopped their car and turned on their emergency flashers. Br. Aplt. at 10.
Defendant is incorrect.
"Not every encounter between a police officer and a citizen is a seizure." State v.
Higgins, 884 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 1994). In fact, a great many police/citizen
encounters begin-and end-as voluntary interaction in which the citizen is free to leave at
any time. See id.; accord State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987 (per curiam);
State v. Bean, 869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994); accord State v. Jackson, 805 P.2d
765, 767 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991). These so-called "level
one" encounters require no Fourth Amendment justification. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S.
429, 437 (1991).4 "[A] seizure within the meaning of the fourth amendment does not
occur when a police officer merely approaches an individual on the street and questions
him, if the person is willing to listen." State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 87-88 (Utah
App.1987) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983)); accord Deitman, 739 P.2d at

4

Utah's appellate courts recognize three different levels of police-citizen
encounters. State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617 (Utah 1987 (per curiam); State v. Bean,
869 P.2d 984, 986 (Utah App. 1994). A level two encounter, discussed in section II
below, requires Fourth Amendment justification and occurs when the suspect is
temporanly seized. Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617; Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. The third level of
police citizen encounter, arrest, must be supported by probable cause, see Deitman, 739
P.2d at 617-618, but is not at issue here.
8

617; Bean* 869 P.2d at 986. This questioning may even be incriminating and include a
request for identification and for consent to search. Bostick, 501 U.S. at 435, 439. An
officer may stop and question an individual at any time so long as a "reasonable person
would feel free 'to disregard the police and go about his business."' Bostick, 501 U.S. at
434 (quoting California v. Hodari £>., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)).
A voluntary, level one "encounter will not trigger Fourth Amendment scrutiny
unless it loses its consensual nature." Bostick, 501 U.S. at 434. Relevant factors in
determining whether an encounter is nonconsensual include an officer's use of physical
force, display of a weapon or a show of authority for purposes of restraining in some way
the liberty of the individual. Bean, 869 P.2d at 987.
Defendant's interaction with Officer Leavitt was a level one encounter because it
was voluntary. Even though Officer Leavitt activated his emergency lights, a factor that
sometimes may constitute seizure, see, e.g., State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah
1986), the facts of this case are distinguishable. First, defendant obviously did not believe
he was detained because he immediately bolted from the scene. See Hodari ZX, 499 U.S.
at 628-29 (seizure does not occur if subject does not yield to show of authority). Second,
although the activation of the emergency lights may have effected a seizure of the car's
occupants, defendant was well on his way down the street before the flashers were
activated (R. 65: 12, 19). Officer Leavitt merely asked defendant if he would speak with
him. There no show of force that would have suggested to a reasonable person that he

9

had to speak with the officer. Thus, the initial encounter between defendant and police
did not constitute a seizure under Utah law.
Moreover, contrary to defendant's arguments, nothing changed the voluntary
nature of the encounter. Under these circumstances, Officer Leavitt was entirely justified
in asking if defendant would return so he could speak with him. Deitman, 739 P.2d at
618. As stated above, defendant voluntarily returned and willingly answered Officer
Leavitt's questions. Officer Leavitt "did not display his weapon, nor did he touch,
restrain, or threaten defendant. He merely asked for defendant's identification." Bean,
869 P.2d at 987. Such enquiries are routine and entirely appropriate. Accordingly, the
interaction between defendant and Officer Leavitt remained a level one encounter and
required no Fourth Amendment justification.
IL

EVEN ASSUMING DEFENDANTS DISCUSSION
WITH OFFICER LEAVITT WAS A LEVEL TWO
ENCOUNTER, THE OFFICER HAD REASONABLE
SUSPICION THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS
INVOLVED IN ILLEGAL ACTIVITY.

Even assuming defendant was seized at the outset, the seizure was justified
because Officer Leavitt had reasonable suspicion the defendant was committing a crime.
Defendant claims he should not have been detained because Officer Leavitt's decision to
question him was based on no more than a "hunch." Aplt. Brief at 12. Thus, defendant
concludes, the officer had no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and the fruits of
the search must be suppressed. Defendant is incorrect; Officer Leavitt did have a

10

reasonable, articulable suspicion to investigate.
Under Utah law, a seizure, termed a 'level two" encounter, occurs when the
suspect is temporarily detained. Deitman, 739 P.2d at 617; Bean, 869 P.2d at 986. A
lawful temporary seizure occurs when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the suspect has committed or is about to commit a crime. Id. Reasonable suspicion
is determined by examining the totality of the circumstances present at the time of the
stop to determine if there was an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity. State v.
Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 141 (Utah App. 1997); see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,21
(1968) (holding stop justified if police officer sees unusual conduct which leads officer to
reasonably conclude in light of officer's experience that criminal activity may be afoot).
"Reasonable suspicion is based on objective facts . . .which are given due weight in light
of the reliability of the information . . . and the reasonable inferences drawn from those
facts." Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 141.
Although, as argued above, Officer Leavitt's encounter with defendant was
voluntary and, therefore, exempt from the Fourth Amendment requirements, he and his
fellow officers did have reasonable suspicion for detaining and questioning defendant.
The officers were patrolling an area near a known "drug house" when they noticed the
unlicensed, unregistered vehicle illegally parked and blocking a lane of traffic (R. 65:6,
17). See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-la-1305(5) and 1303 (illegal to operate vehicle
without registration and license plates); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-101 (parked vehicle

11

cannot block roadway); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-103(l)(a)(ii) (double parking
prohibited)." Officer Leavitt's suspicions were further heightened when he saw a
defendant engage in a hand-to-hand exchange, an activity he recognized from his
experience on the narcotics squad as one of the hallmarks of a drug deal (R. 65:7, 9, 10,
11, 17, 19). Thus, Officer Leavitt had reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal
activity was afoot and that he should investigate.
That reasonable suspicion was only heightened once Officer Leavitt began
speaking with defendant. Almost immediately, defendant admitted that he had driven the
vehicle to that location on a suspended license (R. 65:26). See Utah Code Ann. § 53-3227 (class B misdemeanor for driving on suspended license). Additionally, defendant
appeared extremely nervous as he spoke with Officer Leavitt (R. 65:14, 27). These
circumstances, taken together, provided reasonable, articulable suspicion that illegal
activity had been or was about to take place and that further investigation was warranted.
Additionally, although defendant offered a potentially legitimate explanation for
the circumstances-that he was selling the car to the other two men-this story could not be
confirmed. Although defendant produced a receipt and claimed it reflected his purchase
of the car, Officer Leavitt found that the receipt did not indicate what had been purchased
(R. 65:23-24). Additionally, because the car had no license plates, it was impossible to

5

Additionally, there was no indication defendant had complied with Utah laws
regulating the repair, use and resale of salvaged vehicles. See generally Utah Code Ann.
§§41-la-1001-12.
12

determine whether it may have been stolen (R. 65:22-24, 26).6 Cf. State v. Johnsotu 805
P.2d 76 K 763 (Utah 1991) ("[T]he fourth amendment allows officers to further detain the
vehicle and its occupants when the driver fails to produce identification or is not the
owner"). Finally, defendant's claim that he was engaged in a legitimate attempt to sell
the car was belied by the fact that he bolted from the scene, leaving his vehicle behind (R.
65:12, 19).
Defendant also claims these facts could not create reasonable suspicion because
they are "kat least as consistent with lawful behavior as with the commission of a
crime/" Aplt. Brief at 17, n.10 (quoting Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, \ 19,
998 P.2d 274). Once again, defendant ignores numerous indicia of illegal activity—
factors-the numerous motor vehicle violations, defendant's proximity to a "drug house,"
his hand-to-hand exchange, his attempt to leave the scene and his extreme nervousness
But even if, as defendant claims, the facts were subject to a perfectly innocent
interpretation, the officers were not required to give defendant the benefit of the doubt.
u

Where a defendant's conduct is 'conceivably consistent with innocent. . .activity,' but is

6

Indeed, the colloquy between defendant's counsel and Officer Leavitt seems to
suggest that the vehicle actually was stolen.
Q:
A:

And he [defendant] told you something that had nothing to do with drugs,
that basically it was a stolen vehicle.
Correct.

(R. 65:21).
13

also w strongly indicative' of criminal activity, a reviewing court will not hesitate to
conclude that reasonable suspicion exists." Provo City Corp. v. Spotts, 861 P.2d 437, 440
(Utah App. 1993) (citation omitted); accord U.S. v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th
Cir. 2001) ("[W]e accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent
and suspicious actions.").
In Spotts, the arresting officer observed the defendant sitting in a car smoking a
small, rolled cigarette, which disintegrated rapidly as it burned. Id. at 441. The
defendant also had all the windows in the car rolled up, even though it was a hot day.
After his arrest for marijuana possession, the defendant contended his conduct was just as
consistent with that of an individual smoking a hand-rolled tobacco cigarette. Id. at 44041. This Court disagreed, noting that although such behavior can be innocent, it is also
consistent with "the rather unique hallmarks of marijuana usage." Id. at 440.
Accordingly, this Court held that the officer had reasonable suspicion to investigate.
Similarly, here, Officer Leavitt observed numerous indicia of illegal activity,
including the hallmarks of a drug deal, all of which were carefully articulated in the
suppression hearing. Although any one of these indicators taken alone would likely be
insufficient, taken together they are more than adequate to constitute reasonable suspicion
that defendant was engaged in or about to engage in criminal activity. Accordingly, the
trial court properly denied the motion to suppress the evidence recovered during the
search.

14

III.

OFFICER LEAVITTS QUESTIONING OF
DEFENDANT WAS WELL WITHIN THE SCOPE OF
THE STOP, WHICH WAS EFFECTUATED TO
INVESTIGATE A POSSIBLE DRUG TRANSACTION
AS WELL AS TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS.

Defendant states that even if there was reasonable suspicion to support his seizure
by officers, the evidence obtained by Officer Leavitt should still have been suppressed
because the questioning exceeded the scope of the stop. Br. Aplt. at 19.
Detention of a suspect "must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious
criminal activity." State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, ^ 10, 994 P.2d 1278 (citations and
internal quotations omitted). Once a detention is made, it "must be temporary and last no
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S.
491, 500 (1983). The officer must "diligently pursue[ ] a means of investigation that [is]
likely to confirm or dispel [his or her] suspicions quickly, during which time it [is]
necessary to detain the defendant." State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah App. 1991).
Defendant claims that police should have released him after he provided "a
truthful, lawful explanation of his activities."7 Aplt. Brief at 19. In support, defendant
cites State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, H 11, 17 P.3d 1135, and State v. Robinson, 797
P.3d 431, 433 (Utah App. 1990), two cases in which this Court reversed convictions after
determining that the questioning by police exceeded the scope of the initial stop.

7

Defendant's claim on appeal that his activities were lawful is contradicted by the
fact that he admitted driving the vehicle on a suspended licence and that the vehicle was
without registration or plates (R. 65:22-24, 26).
15

However, these cases, which involved routine traffic stops that led to arrests on
drug charges, are distinguishable from the facts in this case. Here, Officer Leavitt
initiated the stop based on several factors. As noted above, the officers were patrolling an
area near a known "drug house" when they noticed the unlicensed, unregistered vehicle
illegally parked and blocking a lane of traffic (R. 65:6, 17). Additionally, Officer
Leavitt's firsthand observation of the hand-to-hand exchange added further support to the
reasonable suspicion that he had interrupted a drug deal in progress. See U.S. v. Williams,
139 F.3d 628, 630 (8th Cir. 1998) (officer who observes activity indicative of drug deal
has reasonable suspicion to detain and question suspects). A proper investigation of these
circumstances required going beyond the fairly circumspect scope of a mere traffic stop.
Moreover, an investigating officer with reasonable suspicion is not required to
simply accept a suspect's explanation of the suspicious activity. Williams, 271 F.3d at
1269. Defendant's explanation that he was in the area because he was selling his car may
be plausible; it may even be true. Nonetheless, at the time of the encounter, defendant's
explanation could not be immediately substantiated because the car had no license plates
or registration and the sales receipt produced by defendant did not state what was
purchased.8 Additionally, defendant admitted to illegal conduct-he said he drove an

8

Although the occupants of the car apparently told the other officers that
defendant was selling the car, this information was not conveyed to Officer Leavitt until
after defendant's arrest (R. 65:20). Moreover, the officers were not required to accept this
information as true absent some independent confirmation.
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unregistered, unlicensed car without a driver's license. This information alone would
justify further inquiry to determine if the car was stolen. Thus, defendant's
unsubstantiated explanation coupled with other factors-his proximity to a "drug house,"
his hand-to-hand exchange, his attempt to leave the scene, his extreme nervousnessjustified Officer Leavitt's continued questioning. And while defendant complains that
Officer Leavitt detained him for 22 minutes, this period of time is not extravagant given
the peculiarities and inconsistencies of defendant's story, which Officer Leavitt was
attempting to sort through.
In short, Officer Leavitt acted expeditiously "in order to quickly confirm or dispel
his suspicion." State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 6, at K 11, 994 P.2d 1278. Thus, the
evidence obtained from defendant during the encounter with Officer Leavitt was
admissible and the trial court correctly denied the motion to suppress.
IV.

BEACH'S CONSENT TO BE SEARCHED WAS
VOLUNTARY AND NOT OBTAINED THROUGH
EXPLOITATION OF AN ALLEGEDLY ILLEGAL
DETENTION.

Defendant claims his consent to be searched was invalid because it was coerced
and followed illegal police conduct. This argument is based on a faulty premise because,
as demonstrated above, there was no police illegality. However, even assuming that
defendant had been illegally detained, his consent was, nonetheless, valid.
In State v. Arroyo, the Utah Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for
determining whether consent to a search is lawful. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990). It
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must be determined, first, that the consent was voluntarily given and, second, that the
consent was not obtained through exploitation of the prior illegal police conduct. Id.
A*

Defendant's Consent Was Voluntary.

To be voluntary, consent must be obtained without "duress or coercion, express or
implied." State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, \ 47, 435 Utah Adv. Rep. 3. Factors relevant to
determining whether the consent was voluntarily given are:
1) the absence of a claim of authority to search by the
officers; 2) the absence of an exhibition of force by the
officers; 3) a mere request to search; 4) cooperation by the
owner of the [property]; and 5) the absence of deception or
trick on the part of the officer.
Id. (citations omitted).
Applying these factors under the totality of the circumstances here, the trial court
correctly concluded that defendant's consent was voluntary. In asking whether defendant
would consent to be searched, Officer Leavitt made no claim of authority, used no tricks
or deception and certainly used no force. He merely asked defendant if he would agree to
be searched for drugs or weapons (R. 65:21-22). In response, defendant cooperated by
emptying his pockets (R. 65:22, 25). Because defendant's response was ambiguous,
Officer Leavitt asked again if defendant would consent to a search. Defendant still did
not refuse, but asked if he had done anything wrong (R. 65:26, 27). Officer Leavitt
reminded defendant that he had already admitted to driving without a license and driving
a unlicensed, unregistered vehicle (R. 65:25). Defendant then consented to the search (R.
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65:28).
To make sure that defendant's consent was voluntary, Officer Leavitt told
defendant that he had the right to refuse to consent to the search and that the officers
would not search him if he did not want them to (id.). Despite this offer not to search,
defendant said "go ahead." Then, before he was searched, defendant added: "I'm not
going to lie to you guys[.] I have a little" (R. 65:30-31). Defendant then voluntarily
produced a baggy of methamphetamine (id.).
Defendant's consent was not procured by a show of authority, physical force or
trickery. Rather, it was voluntary, as required by the first Arroyo prong.
B.

The Consent was Sufficiently Attenuated From Any Prior
Police Illegality.

Under the second step of the Arroyo analysis, the court must determine whether
the consent was sufficiently attenuated from the alleged prior illegality. Arroyo, 796 P.2d
at 691 & n.4. Factors in the attenuation analysis include the temporal proximity of the
illegality to the consent, the purpose and flagrancy of the conduct, and the presence of
intervening circumstances. Id.
Applying those factors to the facts of this case, it is clear that the temporal
proximately of the alleged illegal conduct and the consent was a matter of minutes.
However, temporal proximity alone is insufficient to establish exploitation of the alleged
illegalities. Id. at 294. Moreover, the temporal proximity of the consent to the allegedly
illegal conduct is mitigated where, as here, there are "nonthreatening, congenial
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conditions" between the officer and the suspect. State v. Anderson, All N.W.2d 277, 281
(Wis. 1991). Intervening factors also weigh in favor of attenuation. For example, Officer
Leavitt's admonition to defendant that he need not consent to being searched served to
insulate defendant's consent from any prior illegalities. See Brown v. Illinois,422 U.S.
590, 603-604 (1975) (Miranda warnings important factor in determining whether consent
was attenuated from prior illegality). Under these circumstances, defendant's consent to
the search, which disclosed that he possessed methamphetamine, was sufficiently
attenuated from what defendant has implausibly attempted to characterize as an illegal
detention. Accordingly, defendant's consent was given voluntarily and the resulting
evidence was admissible. The trial court's denial of the motion to suppress should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's
conviction be affirmed.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this * l f t 1

day of January, 2002
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General
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Assistant Attorney General
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